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Lewis ([1973b]) famously defined event c to be causally relevant to event e in
world w just in case O (c) and O (e) as well as ¬O (c) ¬O (e) are true in w,
where O (c) and O (e) say that c respectively e occurs. For him this implied that
O (c) O (e) is true, because he was assuming the underlying logic to be VC,
which validates
(
α ∧ γ) ⊃ (α γ). If one works with the weaker system V the
causal relevance of event c to event e has to be defined as follows:
1. both c and e occur in w; i.e. O (c) and O (e) are true in w
2. if c had not occurred, e would not have occurred either in w; i.e. ¬O (c)
¬O (e) is true in w
3. if c had occurred, e would have occurred as well in w; i.e. O (c) O (e)
is true in w
A typical semantics for counterfactual conditionals says that ‘if A were the case,
C would be the case’, α γ, is true if and only if C is true in all the closest
A-worlds (Lewis [1973a]; Stalnaker [1968]). Closeness or distance is spelt out
in terms of a relation between possible worlds. In another paper (Huber [ms])
I have defended a ranktheoretic semantics for counterfactual conditionals based
on a principle, called the Royal Rule, linking objective modalities and subjective
beliefs. This principle implies that distance has the structure of a ranking function.
Ranking functions have been developed in (Spohn [1988]). They can be de-
fined as functions r from an algebra of propositions AW over a set of possible
worlds W into the set of extended natural numbers N ∪ {∞} such that the tauto-
logical proposition W is assigned rank 0, r (W) = 0, the contradictory proposition
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∅ is assigned rank ∞, r (∅) = ∞, and the rank of a disjunction A ∪ B equals the
minimum of the ranks of the disjuncts A and B, r (A ∪ B) = min {r (A) , r (B)}.
According to this ranktheoretic semantics a counterfactual conditional α
γ is true at world w in model
(
W,AW, (rw)w∈W , ϕ) if and only if ϕ (α)rw ⊆ ϕ (γ).
Here W is the set of all possible worlds,AW is an algebra of propositions over W,
(rw)w∈W is a family of ranking functions defined onAW, and ϕ is an interpretation
function on the underlying language L. ϕ (α) is the set of worlds w from W in
which the sentence α from the language L is true, and ϕ (α)rw is the set of rw-
minimal elements of ϕ (α)–that is, the set of worlds in which α is true and that are
closest to w from the point of view of rw.
The system V is sound and complete with respect to this ranktheoretic seman-
tics. If the models
(
W,AW, (rw)w∈W , ϕ) are weakly respectively strongly centered
in the sense that rw ({w′}) = 0 if respectively if and only if w = w′1, then the
system VW respectively VC is sound and complete with respect to the resulting
weakly respectively strongly centered ranktheoretic semantics. V, VW, and VC
are axiomatized in Lewis ([1973a], ch. 6).
In terms of the ranktheoretic semantics for counterfactuals the last two clauses
of Lewis’ definition of causal relevance translate into
2’. rw
(
O (e) | O (c)
)
> rw
(
O (e) | O (c)
)
,
3’. rw
(
O (e) | O (c)
)
> rw (O (e) | O (c)),
provided rw
(
O (c)
)
and rw (O (c)) are finite. Causation itself is then defined as the
transitive closure of causal relevance.
There are several well-known counterexamples to Lewis’ counterfactual the-
ory of causation, and Lewis has since refined his account (Lewis [1986], [2000]).
The interested reader is referred to the collection of articles in (Collins & Hall &
Paul [2004]). In a parallel effort people have tried to provide a probabilistic theory
of causation, starting with (Suppes [1970]) up to the sophisticated work of (Spirtes
& Glymour & Scheines [2000]). (Pearl [2009]) and (Woodward [2003]) pay hom-
mage to both traditions, although the former leans more towards the probabilistic,
and the latter more towards the counterfactual paradigm.
(Spohn [1983], [2006]) develops a theory of causation in the tradition of the
probabilistic paradigm except that he is working with ranking functions instead
of probability measures. He is able to elegantly deal with the problems besetting
1If the algebraAW is not rich enough to contain all singleton propositions {w′}, the formulation
is more complicated.
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Lewis’ account–most notably causation by overdetermination and causation by
preemption–but the one big problem his account faces is that it is subjective.
More precisely, causal relevance–actually (Spohn [2006]) starts with the nar-
rower notion of direct causation–and causation are only defined relative to an
epistemically interpreted ranking function. Spohn is aware of this problem and
has developed a way to partly “objectify” ranking functions by associating them
with propositions (Spohn [1993]). However, his attempt at objectification is more
complicated than successful. In particular, the crucial notions of direct causation
and causation are only conditionally objectifiable.
Given a semantics of counterfactuals in terms of objective ranking functions,
one is able to interpret Spohn’s account of causation in terms of these objective
ranking functions. It is then interesting to consider the relation between this ob-
jective version of Spohn’s account of causation and the version of Lewis’ account
of causation one obtains from the ranktheoretic semantics for counterfactuals.
Ignoring some details–in particular, (Spohn [2006]) assumes that effects never
predate their causes–we can paraphrase Spohn’s definition of direct causation of
event e by event c in world w as follows: both c and e occur in w; i.e. O (c) and
O (e) are true in w, and Spohn’s Inequation holds:
Ra
(
O (e) | O (c) ∩Hw
)
− Ra (O (e) | O (c) ∩Hw) > Ra
(
O (e) | O (c) ∩Hw
)
− Ra
(
O (e) | O (c) ∩Hw
)
Here Hw is the complete history of world w up to right before the effect e, but ex-
cluding the cause c (Spohn’s framework allows him to give a precise formulation
of this clause). As before, causation itself is then defined as the transitive closure
of direct causation.
For Spohn Ra is an ideally rational agent’s prior ranking function. According
to the ranktheoretic semantics counterfactuals receive truth values relative to pre-
suppositions or contexts (Stalnaker [1970], [1998]). If we assume, as is plausible,
that the relevant context for direct causation is the complete history up to right be-
fore the effect but excluding the cause, Hw, and if we further assume that the agent
can know that c causes e only if she is certain of the relevant modalities Tw, i.e.
Ra (·) = Ra (· | Tw), it follows from the Royal Rule that rw (·) = Ra (· | Hw ∩ Tw).
Given these assumptions Lewis causation turns out to be a special case of
Spohn causation, because causal relevance is a special case of direct causation.
Suppose c is causally relevant to e in w in the sense of Lewis. Then the left-hand
side of Spohn’s Inequation is positive and the right hand-side of it is negative.
Thus causal relevance implies direct causation. The converse is not true, because
Spohn’s Inequation may hold if both sides are, say, positive, but the right-hand
side is greater than the left-hand side. According to (Spohn [2006], sct. 5) this
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happens in cases of causal overdetermination and trumping.
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